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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MATHEW J. Mc·CORMICK, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LIFE IN'SURAN'CE CORPORA-
TION OF AMERICA, a 
corporation, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 8593 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
·Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Martin M. Larson, Judge 
This is an action on a contract seeking to 
recover 20 7o sales commission for subscriptions to 
and sales of stock in_ a life insurance corporation 
by the respondent, McCormick. The case was tried 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
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of Utah. Trial was before the Honorable Martin 
M. Larson, Judge without a jury. The trial Judge 
g:-a11ted the respondent's motion to strike certain 
evidence regarding the expenses involved in the 
sale of the stock and the promotion of the corpora-
tion ( R 285 & R 299) and denied the appellants 
offer of proof (R 417-418) showing the expenses 
of organizing and promoting the corporation and 
selli11g the stock which would have shown costs 
of organizing and promoting in excess of l5ro. 
The trial Judge entered the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of- Law allowing a 20 per cent com-
mission on a part of the subscriptions and stock 
sales and allowing a 15 per cent commission on the 
balance of the subscriptions and stock sales claimed 
by the respondent (R 39-57). A part of the com-
missions were allowed on subscription notes which 
were cancelled by the corporation and certain so 
called "personal notes" which were also cancelled 
or terminated (R 39-R 57). The Judgment and 
Decree was entered on the 31st day of August, 1956 
( R 58) . Notice of Appeal was filed on the 2nd day 
of October, 1956 (R 65), and the Designation of 
Record was filed on the 2nd day of October ( R 69). 
The Record on Appeal was filed November 8, 1956. 
S'TA'TEMEN'T OF FACTS 
For convenience, Life Insurance Corporation 
of America, the defendant and appellant, shall here-
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inafter be referred to as Licoa and the plaintiff 
and respondent, Mathew J. McCormick, shall here-
inafter be referred to as McCormick. 
Licoa was initially organized as a mutual bene-
fit con1pany to conduct a life insurance business 
in the State of Utah (R 39). It was decided by the 
Board of Directors and the policy holders of the mu-
tual benefit company to form a stock corporation for 
profit for the purpose of conducting the life insur-
ance business (R 100-101). On or about the 18th 
·day of September, 1952, Licoa and McCormick en-
tered into an agreement in writing (the first three 
pages of Exhibit # 13) which provided among other 
things that the plaintiff had the exclusive right to 
sell the stock in the defendant company for 18 
months and receive as a commission 20 per cent 
of the bankable receipts (Exhibit # 13). In per-
formance of the contract, McCormick sold for cash 
and delivered to the company shares of stock for a 
purchase price of $142,729.86 (R 41). McCormick 
also delivered to the company certain "personal 
notes" for shares issued or to be issued equal to the 
sum of $32,961.71 (R 41). McCormick also delivered 
to Licoa certain real estate mortgages and contracts 
for which stock was issued or to be issued for a 
purchase price of $41,180.00 (R 41). McCormick 
also delivered to the company certain so called "sub-
scription notes" which had a balance due, at the 
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subscription notes, and contracts according to the 
terms and provisions thereof so that McCormick 
would receive his lawful share of the cash which 
Licoa was entitled to receive pursuant to the pro-
visions of all of the instruments ( R 42), that can-
cellation of all of the subscription notes, mortgages, 
and contracts without giving McCormick an oppor-
tunity to collect or enforce them was a violation of 
Licoa's duties to McCormick. The notes which 
were cancelled were found by the insurance 
commissioner of the State of Utah to be 
non-admissable assets ( R 396-401). ·The trial 
Court also found that McCormick would be per-
mitted to retain the 20 per cent commission on 
everything upon every sale which a 20 per cent com-
mission had been allowed by the company ( R 44) 
and allowed a 15 per cent commission on all sub-
scription notes, personal notes, mortgages, and real 
estate contracts, and defendant appeals. 
ST A:TEMEN'T OF POINTS 
POINT I 
SEC'TION 316-7 UCA, 1953, PROHIBITS EXPENDI-
TURES FOR PROMOTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
EXPENSES OF LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATIONS 
IN EXCESS OF 15 PER CEN'T OF THE FUND'S RE-
CEIVED ON STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS AS AND WHEN 
ACTUALLY RECEIVED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE EXPENSES OF OR-
GANIZATION AND DENYING LICOA'S OFFER OF 
PROOF OF PAYMENT OF EXPENSES WHICH WOULD 
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ES'TABLISH THAT ALLOWANCE OF THE COMMIS-
SION TO McCORMICK WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF 15 
PER CEN1T. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
COMMISSIONS ON SUBSCRIPTION NOTES WHICH 
WERE IN DEFAULT AND CANCELLED AS THE 
ONLY REMEDY LICOA HAD UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE NOTE. 
POINT I 
SECTION 316-7 UCA, 1953, PROHIBITS EXPENDI-
TURES FOR PROMOTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
EXPENSES OF LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATIONS 
IN EXCESS OF 15 PER CENT OF THE FUNDS RE-
CEIVED ON STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS AS AND WHEN 
AC'TUALLY RECEIVED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
TES'TIMONY REGARDING 'THE EXPENSES OF OR-
GANIZATION AND DENYING LICOA'S OFFER OF 
PROOF OF PAYMENT OF EXPENSES WHICH WOULD 
ES'TABLISH THA'T ALLOWANCE OF THE COMMIS-
SION TO McCORMICK WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF 15 
PER CEN'T. 
Licoa agreed to pay McCormick a 20 per cent 
commission from the proceeds of the sale of stock. 
In addition to the commission to be paid Licoa, . 
certain other expenses for the promotion and organ-
ization of the corporation were paid by Licoa. Mc-
Cormick sold a part of the stock to be issued by the 
company for cash, a part for real estate contracts I 
and mortgages, a part for personal notes, and a part 
for subscription notes which subscription notes pro-
vided that the only remedy of Licoa was the for-
feiture of amounts paid under the notes. Licoa paid 
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McCormick a 20 per cent commission on approxi-
mately all cash receipts of the company and on the 
real estate contracts received by the company to 
the date of termination of McCormick's agreement. 
Commissions were paid at the rate of 20 per cent 
on receipts. The so called personal notes and sub-
scription notes were in default and found to be non-
admissable assets by the Insurance Commissioner. 
The company cancelled the notes and returned them 
to the subscribers. The company issued stock for 
the sums which had been paid in on the subscription, 
and personal notes. The trial court granted McCor-
mick's motion to strike all evidence concerning the 
expenses of promoting and selling the stock which 
were above the commission paid to McCormick ( R 
285 & R 295) and denied Licoa's offer of proof with 
regard to the expense of selling the stock (R 417-
418). ·The proof offered would establis·h that the 
expenses borne by Licoa were in excess of 15 per 
cent. The denial of this proof and the failure to use 
such in computing the sum which might be paid 
to McCormick denied the stockholders their rights 
under the code and violated the trust of the policy 
holders. 
Section 31-6-7 UCA, 1953 provides: 
RECITALS REQUIRED IN PERMTT-DUR-
ATION OF PERMIT 
Every solicitation permit issued by the commis-
sioner shall : 
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1. 
2. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
* * 
3. Limit the portion of funds received on ac-
count of stock subscription, if any are proposed to 
be taken, which may be used for promotion and or-
ganization expenses to such amount as he deems 
adequate, but in no event to exceed fifteen per 
centum of such funds as and when actually received; 
4. * * * * 
The purpose of the code provision limiting ex-
penditures for promotion is to assure subscribers 
that 85 per cent of their funds paid in shall be safe 
from appropriation by promoters and is to be held· 
in trust for the benefit of the subscribers for use 
by the corporation and for the protection of policy 
holders who purchase policies with the corporation. 
It is for the further purpose that in the event that 
the promoters are not successful in promoting the 
corporation and qualifying it to do business under··' 
the laws of the state, that the subscribers will have 
returned to them 85 per cent of the funds that they 
have delivered into trust. 
One dealing with a trustee is charged with a 
knowledge of the trustees power and McCormick is 
so charged in this action. When he went to work 
for Licoa he knew or should have known the limita- '· 
tions of the power of the promoters of the corpora-
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tion. Out of the 15 per cent available for expenses 
must come all expenses of promoting and organiz-
ing the corporation including the commissions of 
McCormick. 
If the promoters can use 15 per cent of the 
money paid in on stock subscribers in partial satis-
faction of the promotion and organization expenses 
and then incur debts and obligations which the cor-
poration must pay, as soon as it is licensed, out of 
funds which are theretofore immune, the statute 
becomes worse than useless. It denies the subscribers 
and the policy holders in the corporation the pro-
tection which they are given under the code and the 
code provision would become a decoy for credulous 
subscribers and credulous policy holders and the 
corporation would become a prey to those who had 
evaded the statute. The entire organization expense 
and promotion expense should all be considered in 
determining any sum that might be due McCormick 
as commissioned. 
In Anchor Life & Accident Insurance Company 
vs. Taylor, Court Appeals of Ohio, (1928) 163 N. E. 
631, a similar statutory provision to that of the 
Utah provision was interpreted by that court as 
holding that commissions must be limited by other 
organizational expenditures. · 
44 CJS, Pages 632, Section 99 states the prop-
osition as follows: 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Statutory limitation on promotion ex-
penses. Under statutes providing that promo-
tion and organization expenses of insurance 
companies cannot exceed a prescribed percent-
age of the amount actually raised on stock 
subscriptions, an insurance corporation which 
is in process of formation, preliminary to its 
license to do business, has no power to con-
tract for preliminary expenses beyond the 
percentage prescribed by statute. 'The purpose 
of such a provision is to insure that a certain 
percentage of the funds paid in shall be safe 
from appropriation by promoters, and held 
in trust for the benefit of those subscrib-
ing to the corporate stock. Out of the pre-
scribed percentage must come all the expenses 
of promotion, including compensation for an 
individual who has performed work in con-
nection with the sale of the company's cor-
porate stock preliminary to securing a license. 
A promoter cannot use the prescribed per-
centage in partial satisfaction of the pro- _ 
motion expenses and then incur further debts 
which the corporation will be required to pay 
out after being licensed.'' 
See also 18 Appleman's Insurance Law and 
Practice Section 10005 at Page 21 in which Apple-
man recognizes and follows the law as announced 
in the Ohio case. 
Under a statute such as the Utah statute, it 
is beyond the power of the corporation and the 
power of the Insurance Commissioner of the State 
of Utah to contract for or to authorize expenditures 
for promotion and organization expenses of an in-
10 
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surance company in any amount in excess of 15 
per cent of the funds as and when they are actually 
collected. 
It was error for the trial court to deny the 
introduction of proof of expenditures for the organ-
ization and promotion of Licoa and such proof be 
used in the determination of any recovery that 
might be had by Licoa. 
POINT I 
SECTION 31-6-7 UCA, 1953, PROHIBTTS EXPENDI-
TURES FOR PROMOTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
EXPENSES OF LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATIONS 
IN EXCESS OF 15 PER CENT OF 'THE FUNDS RE-
CEIVED ON STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS AS AND WHEN 
ACTUALLY RE·CEIVED. 
A. * * * * 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
COMMISSIONS ON SUBSCRIPTION NOTES WHICH 
WERE IN DEFAULT AND CANCELLED AS THE 
ONLY REMEDY LICOA HAD UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE NOTE. 
The subscription notes provided that the only 
remedy of Licoa was to retain the amounts paid as 
damages on the notes ( R 42) . This is in keeping 
with the provisions of Section 31-6-14 U1CA 1'953 
providing that subscription contracts should pro-
vide forfeiture as the only remedy for failure to 
make payments when due on subscription notes. Any 
coercive of action against the stockholders by the 
11 
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promoters or to permit McCormick to take any co-
ercive measures against the subscribers would be to 
delay the formation of the corporation and defeat 
the apparent purpose of the code. Such a require-
ment would also have the effect of involving the 
formation of a life insurance corporation in liti-
gation of subscribers notes and claims against the 
subscribers who are in default under the note and 
thereby delaying the effective promotion of a life 
insurance corporation beyond the term for which a 
permit can be issued a period of two years as pro-
vided in Section 31-6-7 UCA, 1953. 
Section 31-6-14 UCA 1953 provides as follows: 
PROPOSED INSURER ON SYNDI-
CATE - POWERS OF ISSUANCE OF 
STOCK OR PARTICIPATION AGREE-
MEN'T - FORFEITURE OF SUBSCRIP-
TION CONTRACT. 
1. No such proposed stock insurer, cor-
poration, or syndicate shall issue any share 
of stock or participation agreement except for 
payment in cash or in securities eligible for 
investment of funds of insurers, or until all 
subscriptions received under the solicitation 
permit have been fully paid, and, if an in-
surer, a certificate of authority has been 
issued to it. 
2. Every subscription contract to shares 
of such insurer or corporation calling for 
payment in installments, together with all 
amounts paid thereon, may at the option of 
12 
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the insurer, be forfeited if payments are not 
made on or before due dates and upon failure 
to make good any such delinquency upon not 
less than forty-five days' notice in writing, 
and every such contract shall so provide. 
Section 31-7-7 UCA 1953, provides-
RECITALS REQUIRED IN PERMIT-DUR-
A'TION OF PERMIT. Every solicitation permit is-
sued by the commissioner shall : 
( 1) Expire two years from its date, 
unless earlier terminated by the commissioner 
under the provisions of this chapter, and shall 
so state; 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
The apparent purpose of the foregoing code 
provisions is to permit the formation of an insur-
ance corporation for profit and provide that such 
corporation will be formed within a reasonable time. 
The desired effect being to have the corporation 
reach the desired capital structure and qualify as 
an insurer or return the funds to the subscribers. 
These sections, read in the light of other code pro-
visions with regard to the formation of stock in-
surers, seem to establish that it is intended that the 
subscribers shall have returned to them 85 per cent 
of their money paid in, in the event that the forma-
tion of the insurance corporation fails. With these 
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provisions in rnind to require the promoters of an 
insurance corporation to bring coercive measures 
against subscribers to enforce the notes or to per-
mit stock salesman to bring coercive action against 
the subscribers would be to force the formation of 
the corporation into a situation where its qualifica-
tion as an insurer would depend upon the final out .. 
come of the course of action or litigation taken to 
enforce the subscriptions. This would defeat the 
purpose of the code provisions as set out above. 
It was error for the trial court to hold that 
there is any duty upon Licoa to return the notes 
in question to McCormick. Certainly it cannot be 
held that McCormick would have any right to do 
anything about the notes that Licoa did not have. .1 
Both Licoa and McCormick were subject to the 
limitations of the code and could only cancel the 
notes or terminate them and declare a forfeiture 
was not declared by Licoa but stock was issued by 
all sums paid in. It cannot be said that the forfeiture 
provisions are for the protection of the subscriber 
himself as it can readily be seen, as pointed out 
above, that it is for the protection of all subscribers, 
whether they have paid in cash, or merely signed 
subscription notes, in that the qualification of the 
corporation to do business as an insurer is depen- ,, 
dent upon its formation within the time provided 
by the code. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
McCormick sold stock to subscribers for notes 
as well as other consideration. The notes provided 
that the only remedy of Licoa was the retention of 
the amounts paid in by Licoa. Licoa cancelled the 
notes when they were in default and refused to pay 
McCormick a commission. The trial court did not 
consider all promotional and organizational expenses 
in dealing the amount that could be paid McCormick 
on his commissions. The trial court awarded com-
missions in violation of the code provision provid-
ing that such commissions would be paid only upon 
cash receipts or the equivalent of cash receipts. The 
code provides that commissions shall be paid only 
upon cash receipts or admissable assets. To violate 
such code provisions as was done by the trial court 
is to defeat the purpose of the code. 'The purpose 
and intent of the code is to protect the subscribers 
against the appropriation of their funds by promo-
ters, to protect policy holders to assure that the 
proceeds of subscriptions will be available to satisfy 
claims of policy holders and to sustain the trial 
court would defeat these purposes. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REE'SE C. ANDERS,ON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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